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0. SUMMARY
The basic premise of this position paper is that the field of military Command-and-
Control (C2) systems offers challenging basic research opportunities to researchers
in the control sciences and systems engineering disciplines. In point of fact, the
analysis and design of complex, survivable, and responsive C2 systems requires
novel advances in the area of distributed dynamic decision-making under
uncertainty. As a consequence, control scientists and engineers are uniquely
qualified to extend their technologies to meet the multidisciplinary challenges posed
by C2 systems and to advance the state of the art in the development of a relevant C2
theory.
The author strongly believes that the methodological, theoretical, algorithmic, and
architectural questions which arise in the context of military C2 systems are generic
and quite similar to those needed to improve the reliable performance of many
other civilian C2 systems, such as air traffic control, automated transportation
systems, manufacturing systems, nuclear reactor complexes etc. All such military
and civilian C2 systems are characterized by a high degree of complexity, a generic
distribution of the decision-making process among several decision-making
"agents", the need for reliable operation in the presence of multiple failures, and the
inevitable interaction of humans with computer-based decision support systems and
decision aids; also, they require the development of novel organizational forms and
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system architectures which provide for the harmonious interface of the mission
objectives associated with the C2 process and the physical hardware, such as sensors,
communications devices, computer hardware and software, and effectors --
weapons or machines -- which implement the overall Command, Control, and
Communications (C3) system whose purpose is to support the global C2 decision
process.
Military C2 systems provide one particular focus for the development of a whole
new class of control/estimation/decision technologies - technologies which share the
intellectual roots of current research in the control sciences, but which can grow
and blossom into methods applicable to a very large variety of civilian complex
systems.
In the remainder of this paper we shall concentrate upon military C2 processes and
C3 systems, since they provide the most stringent performance requirements and
because they exhibit the greatest clear-cut need for quantification of their measures
of performance (MOP's) and measures of effectiveness (MOE's), and the
requirement for novel distributed architectures and organizational forms. The
discussion will undoubtedly reflect the personal bias of the author who has studied
and researched military C3 systems over the past decade, in the sense that the
objectives of a military C2 system are easier to pin down, and the need for
survivable/reliable operation with minimal communications is transparent.
However, it is the strong personal conviction of the author that any technological
advances in the state of the art in military C2 systems are readily transferable to
civilian C2 systems.
1. TWO MILITARY C2 SYSTEMS
1.1 Introduction.
In this section we overview two different Battle Management C3 (BM/C3)systems.
One relates to the defense of naval Battle Groups, while the second addresses issues
related to the Strategic Defense Initiative. The former involves a significant
component of tactical human decision making, while the second is envisioned to act
in an automatic tactical mode. The author has studied both of these in some detail.
Many other BM/C3 systems involving Army, Air Force, and Marine operations
involve similar issues. Our objective is to set the stage for the types of issues which
are important in C2 systems, so that later on we can isolate certain generic questions
common to them. These in turn will define the broad opportunities in which basic
research in the control sciences and system theory can extend its applicability.
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1.2 The Defense of Naval Battle Groups.
A naval Battle Group (BG) is defined as consisting of at least one carrier (CV)
together with several escorting platforms (ships, submarines, and aircraft). The
CV's and their platforms contain a wide variety of sensors and weapon systems
which allow the BG to carry out defensive and offensive missions as prescribed by
higher authority.
The defense of the BG assets is clearly of paramount importance. The threat to the
BG is multiwarfare in character. The BG threat consists of enemy submarines,
which can launch long range missiles and/or short range torpedoes, surface ships
which can launch missiles and/or cannon projectiles, and aircraft that also launch
missiles and/or conventional bombs. As a consequence, the defense of the BG
involves antisubmarine warfare (ASW), antisurface warfare (ASUW), and antiair
warfare (AAW); electronic warfare (EW) permeates the BG operations as well.
The enemy platforms must be detected using information from organic BG sensors
perhaps "fused" together with information gathered by other national assets; they
must also be identified, tracked and engaged (hopefully) before they launch their
offensive weapons against the BG assets.
The BG defense involves several layers. Obviously, enemy submarines, ships, and
aircraft must be engaged before they can launch their long range missiles; this is
often called the "outer battle". "Area defense" against aircraft and missiles is
provided by missile-shooting platforms (the newest one being the Aegis class
cruisers). "Terminal defense" involves individual platform weapons, such as
rapid-fire guns and/or short-range missiles, and different countermeasures
(jamming, decoys etc) that are designed to confuse incoming weapons.
The vulnerability of the BG platforms to enemy weapons, especially nuclear ones,
forces wide geographical dispersal of its platforms. Also, long-range submarine
detection requires certain platforms to operate at the fringes of the BG formation.
Thus, it is not unusal for a multicarrier BG to have its platforms spread-out over
hundreds of miles. The large geographical dispersal of the platforms makes it
difficult to communicate with each other, using line-of-sight communication
frequencies, while escaping enemy detection of the communication signals that help
localize the BG location and denying the enemy the detection of certain unique
electromagnetic emissions that may reveal the identity of certain platforms. Hence,
survivability considerations must be traded-off with the need to communicate so as
to coordinate the BG defensive operations.
At present the U.S. Navy also operates under a distributed C2 doctrine, the
so-called Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrine which reflects the
complexities of Naval warfare and survivability. The senior admiral in charge of
the BG (CWC), under the CWC doctrine, can delegate command and control
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authority and responsibility to three senior warfare commanders: the ASW
commander (ASWC), the ASUW commander(ASUWC), and the AAW commander
(AAWC) who are specialists in their respective warfare areas. It is not unusal for
these subordinate commanders to be located in different platforms so as to improve
survivability and to have direct access to unique sensor data and/or weapon systems.
The CWC assigns control of specific platforms (submarines, ships, aircraft,
helicopters etc) to each subordinate warfare commander, a resource-allocation
problem, so that each one can defend the BG assets from the specific threat in his
assigned domain.
Although the CWC doctrine appears to be reasonable at first glance, it requires
intensive coordination, and hence reliable communications, among the CWC and his
warfare commanders due to several reasons. The first reason is that an enemy
submarine (or surface ship) that has survived prosecution by the ASWC (or the
ASUWC) will launch its missiles and these missiles become the AAWC's problem.
Thus, the AAWC must position his assets in such a way so as to be able to engage
surviving submarine and surface ship launched missiles. The second reason relates
to the fact that most naval platforms have sensor and weapon resources that are
useful in several warfare areas; thus, a destroyer under the control of the ASWC
may still be a very valuable platform for the AAWC. The third reason relates to BG
electronic warfare (EW); the assets for EW are spread among most platforms, and
the superior coordination of the EW assets, at the global BG level, remains an
unsolved problem. The Navy, aware of this problem, has assigned an EW
coordinator - not a commander - to advise the CWC in EW related matters.
1.3 Battle Management C3 in the Strategic Defense Initiative.
The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers extraordinary challenges in the Battle
Management C3 (BM/C3) area. Long-term SDI system architectures envision a
multilayered defense system against ICBM's and SLBM's. Potentially enemy
weapons are engaged in the boost, post-boost, early midcourse, late midcourse, high
endoatmospheric, and low endoatmospheric phases by a variety of orbiting and
ground-based weapon systems. Different sensors reside in diverse satellites in
different orbits, as well as in airborne and ground-based nodes. Orbiting weapons
may include X-ray lasers, chemical lasers, fighting mirrors to direct ground-based
free electron lasers, electromagnetic launched weapons, orbiting kinetic-kill
vehicles etc. Ground based weapons may include free electron lasers, and
kinetic-kill vehicles such as long-range and short-range missiles.
Clearly the direction of the weapon systems must rely upon the BM/C3 functions of
detection, tracking, discrimination (i.e. weapon or decoy?) and damage assesment
information provided by both orbiting and ground-based sensor systems. This
multi-sensor information must be fused and mapped into the weapon-to-target
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assignment and engagement control functions. The distribution of the BM/C3
decision processes is dictated not only by orbital mechanics, but even more by
severe survivability requirements, so that the SDI system can survive significant
enemy attacks by ASAT weapons.
Leaving socio-political considerations aside, the SDI has been criticized in terms of
the feasibility of its huge BM/C3 software requirements, since the tactical system
will have to operate in an automated mode simply because there is no time for
humans to evaluate the huge amounts of sensor information and to arrive at superior
weapon engagement strategies in the short time available (about 30 minutes). The
critics (many of whom are computer scientists) are addressing in the author's
opinion the wrong problem. The challenge is rather a control-theoretic one: how to
properly design the distributed algorithms that implement the diverse BMIC3
functions, so that a prescribed degree of reliability and survivability is maintained.
Although we do not have all the theories as yet, it is the author's belief that many
available results in large-scale estimation, optimization, and control are directly
relevant and applicable to the SDI BM/C3 problem. On the basis of available results
one could argue that, given sufficient research, control theorists and engineers can
develop the required survivable and reliable distributed architectures and
algorithms which will implement the SDI BM/C3 estimation, optimization,
resource allocation, and control algorithms.
2. SOME GENERIC ISSUES IN MILITARY C2 SYSTEMS.
2.1 Introduction.
Altough each military BM/C3 problem has its own unique set of mission
requirements and physical assets, nonetheless all C2 systems have a great degree of
commonality. It is precisely this generic commonality that offers the hope that the
development of a relevant C2 theory will have a significant impact upon the analysis
and design of military C2 systems. A little thought should convince the reader that
the command-and-control of several complex civilian systems also involves similar
generic issues.
In this section we discuss what are the major high-level problems in military C2
systems. We focus, in particular, to issues related to organizational forms and
distributed decision architectures. These are precisely the areas that offer the most
fertile ground for basic and applied research by control scientists and engineers;
these will motivate the more detail listing of relevant interdisciplinary basic
research areas in the sequel. We remark that any analysis tools that help quantify the
expected performance of existing C2 organizations, as well as of synthesis
methodologies that help in designing new superior BM/C3 architectures are
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desparately needed.
2.2 The Impact of Geography.
A military C2 system is a multi-agent organization. The decision agents are both
human decision-makers and computer-based algorithms. The decision agents are
geographically dispersed due to environmental and survivability reasons.
Geographical dispersion is dictated by the environment, the nature of sensors, and
the physics and speed of the weapons. Thus, both geography and vulnerability
contribute to the distributed architecture of C2 organizations. Such geographically
motivated decompositions define, for example, the multiple defense tiers in the BG
defense and in the SDI scenarios. Each defense tier can be further decomposed into
sectors, although protocols for hand-over coordination and need for low-level
communications present thorny issues.
Geographical distances interact with the speed of the weapons, the range of the
sensors, and the tempo of the military operations in the definition of defense tiers,
defense sectors etc. It is important to realize that any technological developments
that impact sensor ranges, weapons speeds, etc must be reflected into a
reorganization of the C2 system in order to maintain superior performance. This
may necessitate doctrinal revisions as well as changes in the architecture of the
BM/C3 system.
2.3 Functional Decompositions and Distributed BM/C3 Architectures.
Another key element that contributes to the way the C2 process is organized has
little to do with geography. The C2 process can be decomposed into a set of
generally accepted C2 functions that must be executed (sometimes serially and
sometimes in parallel and, in general, in an asynchronous manner) to ensure mission
success. This list of functions related to defensive Battle Managment C3 is as
follows:
(1).Threat Detection, based on data from several sensors.
(2).Target Tracking, based on data from several sensors. This function may
involve 2-dimensional tracking by individual sensors and fusion into 3-dimensional
tracks. Sensor cueing, scheduling and control is an integral part of this function.
(3).Discrimination, which results in the resolution of true threats from decoys
often requiring the fusion of data from several (active or passive) sensors. Sensor
cueing, scheduling and control is also an integral part of this function.
(4).Identification, the process by which further identity information of threats
is established.
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(5).Battle Planning, the process by which decisions are made on how to deal
with the identified threat, based on (1) to (4) above, including contigency planning.
(6).Weapon-to-Target Assignment, the set of decisions which lead to the
assignment of one or more weapons to engage each threat, including the assignment
of any necessary sensor, communication, and other resources required for each and
every one-on-one engagement.
(7).Engagement Control, the process by which the decisions in (5) and (6) are
executed in real time.
(8).Damage Assessment, the process by which one identifies and/or verifies
the outcome of the engagement, i.e. whether a particular target has been killed.
The above list of BM/C3 functions have to be executed at a global level, at a defense
tier level, at a sector level etc. The so-called BM/C3 architecture reflects how these
functions are implemented by the sensor, computer, communications, and weapon
hardware and where the BM/C3 algorithms, which realize these functions and are
executed by human commanders and/or computers, are located. It is obvious that
the vulnerability of the humans and hardware that implement the BM/C3 functions,
i.e. the vulnerability of each and every BMIC3 function, is a very strong driver to
the physical distribution of the decision agents; this leads to the problem of first
analyzing candidate distributed BM/C3 architectures and later on the design of C2
organizations which implement the distributed BM/C3 architectures in a superior
manner. Ideally, the survivability of each function to enemy attacks and to
environmental phenomena calls for some redundancy; exact replication should be
avoided if at all possible.
2.4 The Impact of Complexity.
The decomposition of the C2 decision processes is also influenced by the complexity
of the warfare problem. This is, in general, true when simultaneous engagements
involving heterogeneous sensor and/or weapon systems can take place, and human
commanders make a large part of the decisions. For example, the BM/C3 decision
process for the defense of a Battle Group falls in this category. Different
commanders are trained to be "specialists" in different warfare areas, although they
may have to share, and compete for, many common resources. No commander
alone can deal with the inherent complexity of the global engagement; this leads to a
decomposition of the decision process along distinct "expertise" dimensions.
In such C2 organizations team training is essential so as to achieve superior
coordination and to make best utilization of scarce common resources. Indeed, it has
been observed that in well-trained teams the decisions of individual commanders are
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different than those that the same commander would make if he were to operate in
isolation (see Sections 3.4 and 3.5 for additional discussion).
At an abstract level, one can model the decomposition of the C2 process along
specialist dimensions as yet an alternative way of decomposing the generic BM/C3
functions.
2.5 Discussion.
At present, all analysis and synthesis studies related to distributed BM/C3
architectures are carried out in an ad-hoc manner; it is self evident that the
development of quantitative methodologies, theories, and algorithms relevant to the
distributed BM/C3 architecture problem would be welcomed by the defense
community. It is interesting to note here that the C2 community does not, in general,
appreciate the intimate relationship of distributed decision-making algorithms that
execute the BMIC3 functions, their tactical communications requirements, and their
intimate relation to distributed BM/C3 architectures.
It is generally acknowledged that centralized BM/C3 hierarchical architectures are
very vulnerable, introduce possibly unacceptable time-delays, yet are efficient in
resource-utilization. At the opposite extreme, it is also realized that autonomous
architectures (those that operate in a purely decentralized mode with no tactical
coordination whatsoever) are more survivable, require minimal time-delays, but
are most inneficient in the use of scarce resources. Obviously, distributed BMIC3
architectures are the answer, somewhere between centralized and autonomous
ones. The difficulty is that there are an infinite number of ways that one can think of
designing distributed BM/C3 architectures, and no general guidelines are available
on how to even get started!
In short, superior BM/C3 architectures must be distributed in both a geographical
and a functional sense, taking advantage in an integrated manner the impact of
geography, functional decomposition, mission objectives, problem complexity and
the survivability of the BM/C3 functions. Current C2 technology approaches all of
the above problems in a completely intuitive and qualitative way (maybe this is the
reason that Artificial Intelligence salesmen have had funding success). As a
consequence, there does not exist even a systematic methodology that can be used to
understand in a precise manner the complex cause-and-effect relationships inherent
in a C2 process and to describe them using a minimal set of primitives, measures of
performance, and measures of effectiveness. Clearly control scientists and
engineers can have an impact in this key area.
There is no fundamental reason whatsoever which inhibits the emergence of a
quantitative methodology that addresses, in a relevant manner, the challenging
BM/C3 architectural problems. Indeed, one can argue that the strong relationship of
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the nature of the distributed algorithms that implement the BM/C3 functions, which
make strong use of control-theoretic concepts (variants of hypothesis testing,
Kalman filtering, mathematical programming, stochastic optimization, etc), and of
distributed BM/C3 architectures provides a natural starting point in the quest for a
C2 theory. Engineers and scientists trained in control theory and operations
research, and related normative disciplines, are uniquely qualified to develop the
needed basic research for distributed BMIC3 systems.
3. A BASIC RESEARCH AGENDA.
3.1 Introduction.
In this section we outline some basic research directions that appear to be relevant in
the quest for a C2 theory. Needless to say, there is no claim that the suggested
research directions are all inclusive. However, it should become self-evident that
these research directions are in the spirit of the evolving research traditionally
associated with control science and engineering. The control science field
broadened its research horizons into decision-oriented problems more than fifteen
years ago when we started studying "large-scale systems". What we call C2 theory
requires advances in control/estimation/decision technologies along particular
dimensions to support our basic understanding of the BM/C3 processes and their
reliable and effective implementations.
3.2 Understanding a Complex C2 System.
Before we can even analyze, never mind design, a C2 system we must first
understand it. In order to understand it, a common representation language and a
hierarchy of models must be developed which are useful in the sense that the key
variables, transformations of these variables, and measures of performance become
transparent.
Such C2 representation tools are not currently available. Block and functional-flow
diagrams are used to indicate interconnection of physical devices, but these are not
sufficient to capture the information flow, the sequence of events, the essential
precedence relationships, and the time delays that are so crucial.
Some very recent attempts, which show some promise, are based on extensions of
the Petri Net methodology originally developed to model digital computer
operations. The extension of the Petri Net methodology to model BM/C3 systems
requires the assignment of attributes to the Petri Net tokens, stochastic decision
rules, time delays, and nonconcurrent events. Such extended Petri Net
methodologies appear useful because they can help isolate the truly independent
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variables (analogous to a minimal state-space realization), keep track of the
information and physical variables that must be present before a particular decision
can be executed, account for stochastic time-delays associated with the
implementation of the decision process, and capture probabilistic outcomes of the
decisions. Such extended Petri Net methodologies also blend well with finite-state
representations. Further, they can be used to study the C2 process in terms of its
basic generic BM/C3 functions (see Section 2.3), allowing for a certain freedom to
the C2 analyst in controlling the level of aggregation and the degree of detail
appropriate for the questions posed. They also resemble the discrete-event dynamic
models being used to describe manufacturing systems.
3.3 Modeling C2 Systems.
At a very detailed level the state variables underlying any C2 system are both
continuous and discrete; hence, so-called hybrid state-spaces must be studied. The
dynamic evolution of the state variables can be modeled in discrete-time; however,
there does not exist a fixed time interval (such a sampling time) that governs the
evolution of the state variables. Rather, we deal with event-driven dynamical
systems and state-variable transitions occur at stochastic times that are, in general,
asynchronous. Hence, modeling methodologies that are "tied" to a time-
synchronization model are not apt to be either relevant or useful. Therefore,
problem-driven research related to hybrid, event-driven, asynchronous stochastic
dynamic systems is of interest, especially when the state transition probabilities also
depend on the values of not only certain exogenous variables, but also on a subset of
the state variables.
The difficulty with a hybrid state approach to modeling complex C2 systems is the
huge dimension of the underlying state space. Although such fine detail may be
necessary to construct an event-driven microscopic Monte-Carlo simulation (which
may require well over 100,000 lines of FORTRAN code), such large-scale
microscopic simulations (several of which have been constructed for specific
military problems over the years) are time-consuming, expensive, and not well
suited for analysis, design, and evaluation of alternate distributed BM/C3
architectures.Also, "what if' questions are costly to answer using these huge
simulations. Indeed, a major shortcoming of many of the existing large scale
simulation models is that the C2 process is not modeled in a way that tradeoffs
associated with different BM/C3 architectures can be carried out. This brings up the
research need for systematic aggregation methodologies that result in higher level
models that, hopefully, approximate the microscopic interactions and are more
suitable and ameanable to analysis and design.
Few aggregated models exist, and even these have some significant limitations. The
so-called Lanchester Equations of combat, a set of nonlinear differential equations
that model mutual attrition of opposing forces using different types of weapons,
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have been widely used by the military community. However, it is very difficult to
incorporate in the Lanchester-type equations the impact of different distributed C2
organizational forms. The development of high-level models that capture not only
attrition, but explicitly incorporate decision variables that relate the impact of
alternative C2 organizations would be highly desirable, because one could then, in
principle, analyze, synthesize, and optimize the BMIC3 architectures. Ideally, these
aggregate models should have their roots in the microscopic hybrid-state models so
that their predictions can be checked by detailed Monte-Carlo simulations. It would
be very useful to develop aggregation methodologies for this class of systems, with
transparent advantages and shortcomings.
Another set of important modeling-oriented questions relate to the evaluation of
aggregate measures of performance (MOP's) and measures of effectiveness
(MOE's). In optimal control jargon, MOP's involve functions of output variables
that have a specific meaning and are important to a military decision maker; think of
combinations of different MOP's as defining the integrand of the cost-functional in
a dynamic optimal control problem. Similarly, think of MOE's as corresponding to
a particular cost functional which integrates over time a weighted combination of
the MOP's. One of the most important MOP's in any C2 system relates to the time
delays associated with the execution of the generic BM/C3 functions, such as
detection, tracking, discrimination etc (see Section 2.3). The reason is that the
performance of a BM/C3 system is like a race against time between the moving
physical entities (targets, sensors, weapons) and the information variables. In a well
designed BM/C3 system the information variables must win the race; the detection
function must be completed before either the tracking and/or the discrimination
functions can commence, and targets must have been sorted, identified, and tagged
before we can wisely commit weapons against them. Delays in execution of any of
these functions may degrade the kill probability, result in inneficient use of battle
space, cause weapons to be assigned to decoys rather than threatening targets and/or
assign too many weapons against the same target, and perhaps allow many targets to
leak through a particular defense zone.
There exist significant and challenging opportunities in developing large-scale
models that quantify delays for a given BMIC3 architectures; the availability of
these models would allow the C2 analyst to pinpoint bottlenecks which would point
the way for modification of the BMIC3 architecture. Delays arise from a wide
variety of phenomena, e.g. signal processing of sensor data, other computational
delays, communications delays in fusing information, and decision delays associated
with human or algorithmic decision-making. It appears that significant extensions to
the available theory associated with queueing networks are necessary in order to
faithfully describe the elemental and global time-delays associated with a particular
BM/C3 architecture.
To appreciate the relevance of queueing theory think of a target as being a
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"customer" in a service queue; a C2 node must service the target in the sense of
performing a BM/C3 function (e.g. detection, tracking, engagement, etc). In a
proactive BM/C3 system a specific C2 node may be assigned to perform the
appropriate function. Since the target is moving, there is only a finite time-window
of opportunity to service this target; otherwise, the target will leave (leak) that
particular C2 node. Thus, we have to deal with queues with reneging. Although
some theoretical results are available in this class of queueing network problems,
additional research is required to arrive at an expanded set of theoretical results,
together with efficient computational algorithms, to faithfully model the delays in a
BM/C3 system.
Another important basic research area deals with the extension of classical queueing
theory to capture transient effects. Classical queueing theory deals with steady-state
phenomena. In many military scenarios the steady-state assumption is often
violated. At present, such transient phenomena can only be handled by microscopic
simulations, and these are difficult to interface with a classical queueing network
model. Any theoretical developments that help simplify the interface of static and
transient delay models are very relevant and useful. If we develop theories and
algorithms that allow the C2 analyst to evaluate easily both steady-state and transient
delays, then one would also be able to use such queueing network models to study
the vulnerability of the BM/C3 system to enemy countermeasures (jamming, node
destruction) at least from a delay viewpoint.
3.4 Modeling Human Decision Makers in C2 Organizations.
In present C2 systems, almost all of the BM/C3 functions discussed in Section 2.3
are executed by trained human commanders; there are very few computer-based
decision aids in use today. Since a C2 system involves the integration of humans with
physical assets (sensors, communication links, weapons, etc), it is self evident that in
order to analyze the performance of a C2 system one needs some high-level
mathematical models that abstract the decision-making process of trained military
commanders. In the absence of such models one can only rely upon very very
expensive field exercises and war games; these are valuable and necessary, but their
cost precludes the answering of too many "what if' questions. In particular, current
military expertise does not necessarily carry over without significant training to
situations in which technological advances yield new sensor and/or weapon systems.
To put it another way, technological breakthroughs in sensors and/or weapons may
require a drastic reorganization of the BM/C3 architecture in order to realize the
benefits of these "high tech" hardware. It is not obvious that even a top-notch
commander, trained under an older doctrine and within a different C2
organization,will perform at his best, say, in a war game that incorporates the novel
"high-tech" devices.
A most pressing research topic is the development of "normativeldescriptive"
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models of human decision-makers operating in a geographically dispersed and
distributed tactical BM/C3 architecture environment. The term
"normative/descriptive" is used here to stress that the mathematical models of
human decision makers should be based on nonclassical optimization based
formulations, which explicitly include constraints that reflect human cognitive
limitations, the impact of workload, and the protocols associated with the C2
organization.
Distributed detection, estimation, optimization, and organizational design problems
with communications constraints (topics which we shall discuss more in Section 3.5)
result in normative/ prescriptive solutions; they define superior ways that a team of
"agents" should map their nonclassical information patterns into decisions, thus
providing a prescription for the optimal team behavior. Such normativel
prescriptive models are very useful for providing paradigms and help to design
experiments by cognitive psychologists which can pinpoint in what precise sense
trained human decision makers, and the organization as a whole, deviate from the
predictions of normative/prescriptive models and solutions. Experimental results
should then provide "empirical/descriptive" models of individual and
organizational decision making. The next challenge is to blend the outcomes of the
normative and of the empirical research, using the insight provided by the
empirical/descriptive models to introduce additional constraints in the original
normative formulation. The new "hybrid" solution, termed normative/prescriptive,
should yield far better mathematical models of team human decision making and of
the performance of the organization as a whole; note that these "hybrid"
mathematical models can be used for predictive purposes in subsequent BM/C3
modeling and analysis studies.
Control scientists and engineers can assume a leadership position in this fascinating
research area. First, the development of normative/prescriptive models, theories,
and algorithms for distributed decision making is a subject of research that has
received attention (not enough!) by researchers in the large-scale systems area.
Second, control scientists have pioneered the development of mathematical models
that can adequately predict the behavior of a human operator in carrying out a
well-defined task, so that we do have a reasonable past success record in this area.
Third, although there exist many basic research results by cognitive psychologists
in modeling the "bounded rationality" of human decision makers, there are no
results, at present, in the psychology community that address the types of problems
inherent in the distributed tactical decision making environment which is typical in
military BM/C3 problems. Therefore, the solutions of pure normative/prescriptive
distributed decision problems, and the (often) counter-intuitive nature of the
results, will be very valuable in the proper definition of the experimental designs to
be carried out by cognitive psychologists. Some research efforts that use the tools of
normative sciences (control theory, information theory, mathematical
programming, etc) have shown very promising initial results in this area.
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3.5 Distributed Situation Assessment.
The generic BM/C3 functions of target detection, tracking, discrimination, and
identification (see Section 2.3) serve the purpose of providing a global picture of
situation assessment function in the C2 process. Knowing in a timely and accurate
way the identity and attributes of each and every target, as well as its current
location and velocity, is essential in order to construct a list of possible alternative
actions and decide on what seems to be the best one.
From a technology point of view, the situation assessment function falls squarely in
the domain of modern control theory. Most of the basic research findings in
optimal estimation theory, developed during the past twenty five years, have been
applied to the situation assessment function with a great deal of success. It is perhaps
surprising that there is still a great deal of basic research that remains to be done in
order to implement the situation assessment function succesfully in complex BM/C3
systems.
The relevant research directions can be appreciated from the fact that in order to
obtain a clear picture of the threat one must "fuse" information from several,
possibly heterogenous sensors, which are geographically distributed, each obtaining
data from a multiplicity of targets. Thus, any relevant research in this area must
address the generic problems associated with multiple sensors and multiple targets,
including the fact that accurate estimation of both continuous(i.e. position) and
discrete (i.e. identity) state variables is required. Hence, the overall problem
formulation must include a "hybrid" state space (see also the discussion in Section
3.3).
In multi-target problems we have the generic complexity that even when we are
using a single sensor we do not have information over time regarding the matching
of sensor measurements and targets. This phenomenon brings up the issue of data
association which must be performed by the algorithm in addition to its classical
detection and tracking function. Technically, this involves setting up a (rapidly
growing over time) hypothesis-testing problem that necessitates judicious pruning
of the resulting decision tree. The next class of problems often goes under the name
of multisensor correlation, which requires the exchange of information among two
or more sensors in order to improve the hybrid state estimate for a particular
target, and this must be done for several targets at each and every instant of time.
Since each sensor has a different hybrid state estimate trajectory for each target, the
consolidation of information in the multisensor fusion problem requires the
solution of another large-scale hypothesis testing problem. It should also be noted
that identity information is often provided by specialized sensors (e.g. passive ESM
receivers, active discrimination sensors) which more often than not have poor
location accuracy. In short, it is highly nontrivial to design a superior BM/C3
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architecture and associated algorithms that result in an accurate and timely
implementation of the situation assessment function in a dense multi-target
multi-sensor environment. It should be noted that the presense of multiple
hypothesis testing algorithms in such BM/C3 decision structures can be exploited by
digital computers with special parallel processing architectures.
The above discussion suggests that the hybrid state estimation problem and the
associated large scale hypothesis testing algorithms are only a part of the research
challenge. The multisensor fusion problem requires significant tactical
communications among the sensors, and these communications are vulnerable to
enemy intercepts and/or jamming. It is clear that some communication is necessary
to arrive at a superior situation assessment; what is not clear is what is the minimally
acceptable exchange of information. Perhaps, each sensor node should have the
intelligence to transmit information only when it is clear that this communication is
cost-effective. Conversly, each sensor should only transmit information only when
requested; the intelligent sensor that requests information should be sure that the
received information is worth the cost. It should be self evident that such
information transmission options will have a significant impact of the architecture
of the situation assessment function in the BM/C3 system. It should be noted that
present BM/C3 architectures are notorious for trying to communicate everything to
everybody.
The research problems become even more complicated and challenging if we
assume that one or more sensor nodes can be destroyed, with some probability, by
the enemy. In that case the algorithms that implement the situation assessment
function must be distributed so as to improve the survivability of the situation
assesment BM/C3 function. At present we do not have a general theory,
accompanied by algorithms, that addresses this class of problems. The development
of such a theory will have a significant impact in BMIC3 problems, and will
definitely impact the design of superior BM/IC3 architectures which also exploit
parallel processing in digital computers. The theory promises to be highly
nontrivial because it will require the solution of distributed team-decision
problems, with nonoverlapping information patterns including incomplete "models
of the world". To make matters worse, there is strong theoretical evidence that the
underlying optimization problems are NP-complete; hence, we may have to be
satisfied with suboptimal solution algorithms, accompanied however by guaranteed
performance bounds.
In spite of their complexity, a very small number of distributed hypothesis testing
and estimation problems have been solved during the past few years. Obviously
these algorithms are valuable in their own right in automated situation assessment
systems. However, the nature of their normative/prescriptive solutions has also
provided valuable qualitative and quantitative insight into the decision rules of the
completely rational "decision agents" operating in a distributed team decision
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setting. Indeed, one can see in certain team solutions that the decision rules
(mapping of local information into team decisions) of the same decision agent are
very different than those that would have been employed if the same decision agent
was operating in isolation under identical environmental conditions. Another set of
valuable insights relate to the fact that in order for a team of decision makers to
reach decision-consensus, based on different local information, tentative individual
decisions must be communicated to each other with a quantifiable minimum
communication frequency. Thesefindings reinforce the claim in Section 3.4 that the
normativelprescriptive solution of distributed decision problems can have some
impact in experiments carried out by cognitive psychologists, since from a purely
mathematical point of view a perfectly rational decision maker uses different
decision rules depending on whether helshe makes a decision in isolation or as a
member of a team; such a change in the behavioral pattern, if observed, should not
be attributed to the "bounded rationality" of the decision maker.Also, the nature of
normativelprescriptive results can flag the monitoring of key observation and
decision variables in the human team experiments.
3.6 Distributed Battle Engagement.
Following the situation assesment function, the BM/C3 system must execute a
sequence of real time decisions to implement its defense objectives against the
threat. The Battle Planning, Weapon-to-Target Assignment, and Engagement
Control functions (see Section 2.3) are the BM functions that implement the battle
engagement.
Complex multiple weapon-target engagements have benefited somewhat from
available theoretical results in mathematical programming and optimal control
theory. However, these studies have been very problem specific and, more often
than not, the problem formulations, algorithms and tradeoff studies are classified.
To the best of the author's knowledge, there are no unclassified studies that pose
these battle engagement problems in a generic setting, exploit the available
state-of-the-art, and isolate the advantages and disadvantages of present solution
methodologies so as to point out specific basic research directions for future work.
In this class of problems we are concerned with planning and executing several
engagements of M weapons against N targets. The problem complexity is related to
the different options available to the defense. The more options available to the
defense, the harder the problem and the greater the potential payoffs associated with
near-optimal decisions. Residual threat uncertainty also contributes to the
complexity of the defense decisions.
Generic studies of battle engagement issues should include one or more of the
following three types of defense weapons. The potential effectiveness of each
weapon can be quantified by its idealized one-on-one kill probability.
16
C2 Theory M. Athans
(1)One-on-many weapons. Such weapons have the potential to kill several targets all
at once. The X-ray laser, which focuses the X-ray energy of a nuclear explosion
along several beams, is an example of such a weapon. Since such weapons can be
very effective to the defense, their commitment threshold must be carefuly
selected. The presense of such weapons within one or more defense tiers can force
the offense to adopt a different offense strategy than simply a saturation attack.
(2)One-on-one reusable weapons. Such weapons can engage one target at a time, and
must be sequenced over a subset of targets until they run out of resources. Different
types of laser weapons (including orbiting mirrors) and machine-gun type weapons
fall in this category. Note that such weapons must employ some sort of target
sequencing algorithm to decide the order in which they should engage several
targets. Optimal target sequencing algorithms must take into account the different
times to lock-on to a target, to service it, and to slew it against another target.
(3)One-on-one non-reusable weapons. These represent classic one-on-one
engagements. Missile interceptors fall in this class. Often, such weapons require
additional guidance, and perhaps target designation/illumination, resources to hit
their assigned target.
The physical characteristics of the defense weapons interact with the physical
attributes of the targets, geometry, speed etc. Typically, a particular target has a
finite time-window during which it can be succesfully prosecuted by a particular
weapon. The decision to commit a particular weapon to that target must obviously
take into account this time-varying target vulnerability. Relative target/weapon
speed characteristics may require that the weapon-to-target pairing decision be
made long before the target vulnerability window. Other strong temporal effects
arise when the succesful intercept requires that the target be illuminated by a laser
or radar for designation and terminal homing purposes.
One of the neglected areas of research relates to the coupling of the situation
assessment and battle engagement functions. Almost all present studies assume that
the targets have been localized and identified before weapons are assigned to them.
It is very important to capture the residual uncertainty of the threat situation
assessment into the very formulation of the weapon-to-target assignment problem.
This is particularly important in the midcourse phase of SDI defense, where we
must distinguish several thousand re-entry vehicles from many more thousands of
decoys. The optimal use of battlespace may necessitate to tentatively assign missiles
against targets that have not been fully discriminated. As time goes on, the
discrimination function will improve the probability that a particular target is a real
threat or a decoy, and there may be ways to divert a missile tentatively assigned to a
decoy to engage a real thereat. We note that current practice enforces what is known
to control scientists as the "certainty equivalence" principle in stochastic control
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theory. The class of open research problems that we have discussed employ what is
often called the "open loop feedback optimal" policy of stochastic control. Indeed
these problems can become very complex if we assume that an active discrimination
resource must be scheduled, as a function of time, over a set of targets. Then we
must study the simultaneous optimization of the discriminator dynamic schedule and
of the weapon-to-target assignment function.
It should be evident from the above discussion that, as a rule, M-on-N engagements
have a highly dynamic flavor. Also, stochastic effects are dominant, since kill
probabilities are nonunity. The decision variables are both discrete-valued (how
many weapons should we assign to a particular target? which weapon should be
assigned to what target?) and continuous-valued (when should we launch a
particular interceptor? where should we intercept the target?). There may exist
specific problem variants that require optimal use of battlespace; in this vein, the
possibility of salvage fusing, which means that a target with a nuclear warhead
explodes when intercepted, results in very challenging decision-dependent
state-space constraints in the SDI scenario. Extreme care must be exercised to
ensure that the planned intercept trajectories avoid the nuclear fireballs that follow
salvage fusing. As a consequence, stochastic dynamic optimization problems, with
mixed integer programming overtones, are present in most complex battle
engagement formulations. In principle, such optimization problems can be
formulated as stochastic dynamic programming problems with a high degree of
combinatorial complexity. In order to obtain computable solutions one must exploit
the structure of these problems, perhaps decompose them into a subset of simpler
problems, and then develop algorithms that take advantage of the problem-specific
information.
The study of complex M-on-N battle engagements are hard enough even when posed
at a centralized level. The scientific study of distributed battle engagement decision
architectures is just beginning. Presumably, over and above the problems
associated with the existence of non-classical information patterns at each decision
node, one must study the tradeoffs associated with the vulnerability improvement of
the battle engagement decision function vis-a-vis possible misuse of scarce weapon
resources (multiple targeting of the same target, targeting of the wrong target, etc).
Any new results that provide quantitative insight in this class of problems will be
very valuable indeed.
Relevant research in this area must explicitly recognize that the underlying
optimization problems are almost surely NP-complete. Thus, there are numerous
opportunities for designing novel near-optimal solution algorithms with guaranteed
worst-case and expected performance bounds. The distributed version of the battle
engagement problems provides fertile new research directions that blend
architectural issues, decision-theoretic issues, and communication interfaces that
carry the necessary coordinating information.
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4 CONCLUDING REMARKS.
In this position paper we discussed, in an informal way, the nature of the research
topics that we feel are essential ingredients of a general C2 theory. We need a
variety of results that help us understand, analyze, compare, and synthesize BM/C3
systems. We stressed the need for incorporating vulnerability/reliability
requirements which dictate the study of distributed decision-oriented BM/C3
architectures.
The roots of this research agenda are in the traditional discipline of control science
and operations research. We need a hierarchy of modeling tools which help us
understand and model, at different levels of detail and aggregation, complex BM/C3
systems. We need novel theoretical and algorithmic advances in the distributed
versions of multiple hypothesis testing, estimation, and optimization problems,
stressing nonclassical information patterns, costly communications, and explosive
combinatorial complexity. The modeling and analysis of BM/C3 systems with
interacting human decision makers poses special challenges in the development of
"normative/descriptive" models of human decision makers operating in a team
tactical environment. Finally, we need the development of methodologies that help
integrate performance and vulnerability of BM/C3 functions and define superior
distributed C2 organizations and BM/C3 architectures.
Control scientists and engineers have already pioneered the development of specific
C2 quantitative models and analytical tools that improved past practices. These
recent accomplishments, although modest, have had a significant impact on the way
the military C2 community is thinking. Thus, the present climate is very favorable
for basic research in this area, with good opportunities for transitioning basic
research into advanced development. The control community is ideally qualified,
from a technological point of view, to advance the state of the art in C2 theory.
The challenge relates to the way the basic research is conducted. It is the author's
opinion that the major advances in C2 theory will be made by researchers who
invest a great deal of effort and energy in understanding and appreciating the
complexities and subtleties of military BM/C3 systems. We have stressed that
although optimization problems abound, the research issues at a basic level have a
very nontrivial combinatorial flavor. Hence, it is the intimate familiarity with
specific pragmatic issues that will provide the essential guidance to the researcher
on the development of near-optimal algorithms that solve inherently NP-complete
problems. It is highly unlikely that the needed research breakthroughs can be solely
based upon abstract extensions of current theory. It is also evident that
collaborative research between control scientists, cognitive psychologists, computer
scientists, and communications engineers is required to address the many important
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dimensions of BM/C3 systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.
The author has benefited over the past decade from numerous discussions on
research priorities and new directions in the area of C2 systems with several
colleagues. Special thanks are due to A. H. Levis, J. N. Tsitsiklis, N. R. Sandell, D.
A. Castanon, R. R. Tenney, J. G. Wohl, J. J. Shaw, L. C. Kramer, J. R. Lawson, S.
Brodsky, C. Holland, J. R. Simpson, W. R. Vaughn, W. Meyers, D. L. Kleinman,
M. Melich, J. Offut, J. Wozencraft, P. Girrard and W. B. Davenport.
The financial support of the Office of Naval Research under contracts
ONR/N00014-77-C-0532, ONR/N00014-84-K-0519 and ONR/N00014-85-K-0782
is also greatfully acknoweledged.
20
